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Abstract 
This thesis presents an overview of the susceptibility of the Common Law system 
and the Civil Law system on corruption and their respective contribution to a judiciary 
possessing optimal degrees of internal and external independence. A judiciary with 
such independence is, on the one hand, a significant factor in the battle against 
corruption; on the other hand such a judiciary has the greatest likelihood of being 
immune from corruption itself. Since the Common and the Civil Law systems differ in 
the appointment system of judges and their mechanisms of checks and balances, 
each legal system has its advantages and disadvantages in terms of securing the 
judiciary an optimal degree of independence. Various existing, as well as a number of 
prospective features will be presented, which combine the advantages of the 
Common and Civil Law systems. These features would guarantee optimal levels of 
judicial independence, making the judiciary a strong player in the fight against 
corruption.   
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1. Introduction 
 
“Take all the robes of all the good judges that have ever lived on the face of the earth, 
 and they would not be large enough to cover the iniquity of one corrupt judge”
1
 
 
 
A corrupt judiciary harms society in two ways. In the first place, it cannot fulfill 
its task of restraining the legislative and the executive branches of government, 
because it can be bribed or pressurized not to do so. Secondly, fair trials are 
impossible, since a trial‟s outcome will depend upon the amount of the kickbacks paid 
by litigants. Some argue that judiciaries in countries with a Common Law system are 
less vulnerable to corruption because that system has a better mechanism of checks 
and balances, than the Civil Law system, making it harder for judges to disguise acts 
of corruption. Others claim that because political influence on the judiciary in Civil 
Law systems is weaker, it is harder for politicians to put pressure on the judiciary, 
forcing judges to accept bribes and to decide in favor of the politician or his/her allies. 
This thesis aims to describe, in a theoretical way, the influence of the Common Law 
and the Civil Law systems on the creation and prevention of corruption in the 
judiciary.  
Since no index of measured levels of judicial corruption across countries 
exists2, a closer look at the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) is taken, to check if there is any sign that either the Common Law or the Civil 
Law system emerges as the more effective. The Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index offers a very useful insight into how widespread 
                                                          
1
 Henry Ward Beecher (Liberal US Congregational minister, 1813-1887) 
2
 At least to my knowledge. There exists a table that presents the results of surveys that found out the 
perception of judicial corruption in 62 countries. Even though this table deals with corruption in the 
judiciary, I prefer the CPI for various reasons. First, the sample of the CPI is bigger (180 countries 
versus 62) including nearly all countries in the world. Second, the countries using the Common Law 
system are underrepresented in the table dealing with corruption in the judiciary (Only 14.52% of the 
sample are Common Law-countries [11 out of 62] compared to 20% in the CPI [36 out of 180]). Third, 
out of the 11 Common Law countries used in this table, 5 rank in the top quintile of the CPI (45.45%) 
whereas in the CPI the corresponding percentage is 22.22%. Out of these 11 Common Law countries 
used in this table, only one ranks in the lowest quintile of the CPI (9.1%), whereas in the CPI the 
corresponding percentage is 11.11%. Therefore the sample of the table dealing with corruption in the 
judiciary is biased; it produces too good results for the Common Law countries. For the table see 
Transparency International (2007): p. 13    
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corruption is in different countries. The index does not show overall levels of 
corruption in different countries, rather it “ranks countries in terms of the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians”.3 Looking 
at the CPI, those countries using a Common Law system come off comparatively well. 
Of the 180 countries listed on the Corruption Perception Index 20084, 15 countries 
use an entirely Common Law system, a further 21 countries use a mixed judicial 
system with the Common Law system as most dominant part.5 This makes a total of 
36 countries that have a judiciary where the Common Law system plays the most 
important role, which amount to 20.00% of all countries listed on the Corruption 
Perception Index 2008. In the top 20 of the index, however, the share of Common 
Law countries is 40%, in the top quantile (ranks from 1 to 36) the share is 30.55%. In 
the lowest quantile (ranks from 145 to 180) the share of Common Law countries is 
just 11.11%. Further, the average score of countries using a Common Law system 
surpasses the average score of all countries by 0.45 points.6 
The question that arises from these statistics is, whether the legal system has 
an influence on the level of corruption in a country. Since corruption has mainly 
political, economic and social roots, the sole, direct impact of the legal system on a 
country‟s level of corruption is virtually zero. If it were the case that any legal system 
were truly superior to any other, a country using an “inferior” legal system, should be 
able to reduce its level of corruption significantly, simply by adopting the “superior” 
legal system. This is highly unrealistic. The legal systems do have an indirect effect 
on a county‟s level of corruption, however, because they directly influence the degree 
of judicial independence. Since the Common Law and the Civil Law systems differ 
from each other in terms of how much political influence is exerted on the judiciary, 
as well as of who monitors the judiciary‟s performance, the legal system influences 
the independence of the judiciary and therefore its power to fight internal, as well as 
external, corruption. But is the Common Law system superior to the Civil Law system, 
                                                          
3
 Lambsdorff (2007): p. 324 
4
 See Appendix A.1  
5
 These includes countries that use systems that mix Common Law with elements of Civil Law (e.g. 
South Africa), Common Law with customary law (e.g. Hong Kong) or Common Law with Islamic law 
(e.g. India). Countries using some features of the Common Law system but with other systems as a 
basis are not included in this number. A list, showing the legal systems of many political entities is 
attached to the paper. (See Appendix A.2)  
6
 The average score of Common Law countries is 4.48; the average score of all countries is 4.03 
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or vice versa? The answer is: neither way. As will be pointed out later, both systems 
have their advantages and their disadvantages in terms of guaranteeing judicial 
independence. This thesis will explore these advantages and disadvantages and will 
try to discover how the advantages can be combined, to establish a judicial system 
which enjoys optimal degrees of independence.  
In Chapter two, an overview of the nature of corruption is presented and its 
most important economic causes and consequences explained. In chapter three the 
main differences between the Common Law and the Civil Law systems will be 
outlined. In chapter four, several reasons for corruption in the judiciary will be 
identified and it will be shown which weaknesses are peculiar to which legal system. 
In chapter five the importance of an independent judiciary is argued and the 
necessary requirements for an independent judiciary are introduced. In chapter six, 
concrete models that should guarantee a judiciary with “optimal” degrees of 
independence will be presented.      
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2. Corruption - a brief review 
 
2.1. Definition 
 
In most literature, corruption is defined as the abuse of public power for private 
gain.7 In economic terms, “corruption [is] the illicit use of willingness to pay as a 
decision making criterion.”8 Private gain arising from corrupt activities can be financial 
or non-financial: it may be a sum of money, as well as the promotion of political or 
personal advantages. In the most common form of corruption however, a person or a 
firm pays money to a public official in exchange for a benefit. These payments 
pervert the official to oblige the briber, even though it is illegal to do so. Corruption 
happens in the reverse direction too: public officials, such as politicians or judges, 
make payments to private individuals, firms or other officials, to obtain benefits in 
return, which can either benefit the official or his/her party.  
As a matter of fact, corrupt deals succeed only when both sides, the person 
who offers the bribe, as well as the person who accepts it, benefit from it. As a result, 
acts of corruption “occur when the marginal returns from crime exceed the marginal 
returns from legal occupation by more than the expected cost of the penalty”9.  
 
2.2. Low-level corruption 
In defining the term corruption, one has to differentiate between, what Rose-
Ackerman refers to as, “low-level corruption” and “high-level” or “grand” corruption. 
Rose-Ackerman states that low-level corruption “[…] occurs within a framework 
where basic laws and regulations are in place, and implementing officials seize upon 
                                                          
7
 This, or similar, definitions are used in most of the papers dealing with corruption. See for example: 
Treisman (2000), Buscaglia and van Dijk (2003), Rios Figueroa (2008) or Transparency International 
(2007).  
8
 Rose-Ackerman (2006): p. xvii 
9
 Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999): p. 3   
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opportunities to benefit personally”10. Rose-Ackerman describes several situations 
that define low level corruption. Officials may, for example, accord the applicant who 
has the highest willingness to pay a slender public benefit, even though the applicant 
may not be the best qualified or even be qualified at all. Another example of low-level 
corruption occurs when applicants who wait for a public service pay bribes to officials 
to speed up the process or to overcome bureaucratic obstacles. Another very 
common example of low-level corruption is where officials receive payments for 
overlooking illegal activities, such as when policemen accept bribes from drivers 
caught for driving too fast, or customs officials turn a blind eye to smuggled goods in 
exchange for a bribe.  
 
2.3. High-level corruption 
“Low-level” becomes “high-level” when it becomes systematic. Usually, such 
corruption has a political dimension. As Rose-Ackerman explains:  
 
“The bribes may be paid at the lowest part in the hierarchy, but they may be part of 
an organized system that is used to favor political allies and to build campaign war 
chests, and not only to obtain individual cash benefits.” 11  
 
At this point, the negative influences of corruption on the state are much more 
severe and fighting corruption becomes much more laborious and costly. Buscaglia 
explains: 
 
”Systemic corruption deals with the use of public office for private benefit that is 
entrenched in such a way that, without it, an organization or institution cannot 
function as a supplier of a good or service. The probability of detecting corruption 
decreases as corruption becomes more systemic. Therefore, as corruption becomes 
more systemic, enforcement measures of the traditional kind affecting the expected 
punishment of committing illicit acts become less effective”12   
   
Rose-Ackerman distinguishes between three varieties of “grand” corruption. 
The first occurs when leaders of certain branches of the public sector organize large-
                                                          
10
 Rose-Ackerman (2006): p. xviii 
11
 Ibid: p. xix 
12 Buscaglia (2001): p. 2  
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scale corruption in their branch. Common examples, where large-scale corruption in 
the public sector is organized, are tax collection agencies and regulatory 
inspectorates. Another common example of this type of corruption occurs when the 
police work together with organized crime groups to whom a monopoly on a special 
illegal activity is guaranteed and protected by police forces in exchange for financial 
or non-financial gain.  
The second variety of grand corruption is a corrupt electoral system, where the 
outcome of an election depends on bribery.  
In acts of corruption which belong to the third variety of grand corruption, 
politicians or other officials use their power to gain illicit rents from firms. Common 
examples are privatizations of state-owned enterprises or the placing of public 
contracts, such as construction projects, when politicians receive payments from 
firms eager for business.13  
 
Rose-Ackerman further differentiates between two extreme cases of grand 
corruption, namely kleptocracy on the one hand and state capture on the other hand. 
In the first example, the government massively enriches itself at the expense of the 
population; in the second, powerful private groups control the state. In cases of 
kleptocracy and state capture, all three varieties of grand corruption are combined, 
since in such extreme cases, the electoral system is usually corrupt too.  
 
2.4. Economic research on corruption 
Nowadays, more or less every scientific paper dealing with corruption stresses 
the negative effects corruption has on a country‟s economy, stability and society. This 
has not always been the case. Some of the earliest studies of the economics of 
corruption came to the conclusion that if a well functioning corrupt system were 
established, its impact on a country‟s economy would be rather positive. It was 
argued that by bribing officials, bidders avoided costly and economy-hostile rules and 
                                                          
13
 Rose-Ackerman does not mention the two cases of nepotism, where family relations is the most 
important decision criterion in, for example, in placing of orders, and fraud, where public officials 
manage huge budgets and put money out of it on one side. 
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regulations. Further, services went to the bidder who valued them most which was 
also positive for the economy. The prevailing opinion in these studies was, that “a 
bribe is simply a transfer and therefore entails no serious welfare losses”14 
These studies had the major disadvantages that they oversimplified the whole 
concept of corruption. Further, they ignored the huge negative effects of corruption 
on the economy and society. Their claim that corruption boosted economic efficiency 
was usually wrong. Furthermore, these studies did not mention that corruption 
undermined other public goals such as economic development or social welfare 
programs. In the following section, various results of research, which prove that a 
high level of corruption promotes inequality and has a negative impact on a country‟s 
GDP per capita, GDP growth and levels of investment, will be introduced. Other 
current studies demonstrate that corruption lowers government spending,15 leads to 
higher spending on the military16, reduces the quality of public healthcare17 and even 
has a negative impact on people‟s happiness.18   
As almost all of the current scientific studies regard corruption as a negative 
phenomenon that harms the economy and must be eradicated, economic research 
on corruption is crucial in terms of finding ways to fight corruption, as Rose-Ackerman 
emphasizes:  
“From a policy point of view the goals of economic research on corruption are both to 
isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties 
and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb the harms and improve 
the efficiency and fairness of government.”19  
 
2.5. Economic causes and consequences  
As pointed out above, early studies on the effects of corruption described 
corruption in glowing terms, seeing it as a way of side stepping tortuous bureaucratic 
regulation and, as a result, having a positive influence on the economic performance 
                                                          
14 Ades and Di Tella (1997): p. 499  
15
 Mauro (1998) 
16
 Ibid 
17
 Gupta et al. (2001) 
18
 Helliwell (2006) 
19
Rose-Ackerman (2006): p. 15 
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of the country. Recent studies on the other hand are much less indulgent and 
emphasize corruption‟s negative impact on a country‟s welfare.  
Nowadays there is clearly a consensus among economists about the 
fundamental question of whether corruption is harmful to the economy or not. About 
several other related questions however, especially about the causes of corruption, 
opinions differ considerably. In the following section, an overview is given about 
some of the most important likely causes and consequences of corruption - and the 
different conclusions that studies come to. 
   
2.5.1. The causes  
 
2.5.1.1. Size of the public sector: 
Free market economists claim that minimizing the public sector is a well-
proven method of fighting corruption. The argument goes that the less the 
government interferes in the economy, for example via market regulations, the 
smaller is the need for corruption as a tool to circumvent these, often costly, 
regulations. At the macro-level, studies do not support this opinion. For example 
Elliott finds that levels of corruption are low when government expenditure is high.20 
The impact of privatization on corruption is also unclear. Some studies claim that 
privatizations reduce corruption because a corrupt government loses opportunities to 
extract illicit rents.21 Lambsdorff, on the other hand, argues that privatizations may 
only lead to shifts of the corruptive acts from the public to the private sector. Private 
firms‟ staff replace public officials as bribe-takers.22  
 
 
                                                          
20
 Elliot (1997) 
21
 See for example Boyko et al. (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
22
 Lambsdorff (2006)  
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2.5.1.2. Lack of economic competition 
From an economic point of view a high level of competition in a market is 
regarded as positive for the welfare of the state. The relationship between a high 
level of economic competition and the level of corruption is not clear. Indeed, there 
are many indications that high levels of economic competition reduce corruption. 
Most importantly, in a market where there is plenty of competition, firms have fewer 
rents to spend on corrupt activities. Furthermore, politicians and public servants have 
less scope to influence the market on their bribers behalf. Vice versa, when there is a 
lack of economic competition, firms have more profits they can spend on corrupting 
politicians. These points are confirmed by various studies, for example by 
Henderson23 or Ades and Di Tella24. But there is also opposition to these results. One 
argument comes from Ades and Di Tella themselves; they explain that problems of 
causality exist. For example government members may advance the establishment of 
monopolies because they are bribed to do so.25 Furthermore, situations may exist 
where higher competition leads to higher levels of corruption. For example, in 
situations where firms compete not on price but on quality, the incentive to pay bribes 
may increase in order to avoid strict quality controls or to falsify outcomes.26   
 
2.5.1.3. [De]centralization 
In theory decentralization could have both a positive and a negative impact on 
the level of corruption. On the one hand, government institutions would operate 
closer to the people. As a result these institutions would be more accessible to the 
population and take care of their needs more readily and could so reduce the 
incentive for acts of corruption. Furthermore these institutions could fight against 
corruption more efficiently if they were more closely in tune with the population. On 
the other hand, these advantages would only be realized if the decentralized 
                                                          
23
 Henderson (1999) 
24
 Ades and Di Tella (1995) 
25
 Ibid  
26
 Lambsdorff (2006) 
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government were strong. Weak decentralized governmental institutions would be an 
easy target for powerful local criminal groups: small-scale state capture could happen.  
Studies show that the effects of decentralization on corruption cannot be 
described simply and largely depend upon how decentralization is measured. Fisman 
and Gatti take fiscal decentralization on government spending as a measure of 
decentralization and find that it is negatively correlated to corruption27. But several 
other studies come to the opposite conclusion that decentralization is not correlated 
to corruption. 28  All in all decentralization‟s effects on corruption are unclear; 
decentralization is certainly not the most significant measure in reducing corruption.  
 
2.5.2. The Consequences  
 
2.5.2.1. Inequality of income 
To contain inequality of income is one of the most important ways of fighting 
corruption. Successful efforts to reduce or to wipe out gaps in income prove 
especially positive, since they fight the problem of corruption from two directions. On 
the one hand successful measurements to reduce income gaps eliminate a 
consequence of corruption, on the other hand they also strike at one of the roots of 
corruption. While it is clear why corruption increases inequality in income, You and 
Kaghram explain why the reverse causality holds: Usually it is impossible for the poor 
to monitor the activities of the rich, who therefore can misuse their power and indulge 
in acts of corruption with impunity; inequality, therefore, is a breeding ground for 
corruption. Furthermore, they point out that the process of inequality increasing 
corruption is stronger in democratic countries. This is because in such systems, the 
powerful have to use more subtle methods to oppress the poor, namely corruption, 
than in autocracies where the wealthy can oppress the poor more easily. 29 Gupta et 
al. also find that there exists a significant correlation between corruption and income 
                                                          
27
 Fisman and Gatti (2002) 
28
 See for example Arikan (2004) or Adsera et al. (2000) 
29
 You and Kaghram (2005) 
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inequality. Further they discover that corruption increases inequality in education and 
land distribution.30  
 
2.5.2.2. GDP per capita 
As in the relationship between corruption and income inequalities, reverse 
causality exists also in the relationship between corruption and GDP per capita. As 
Paldam points out, on the one hand corruption is likely to reduce GDP per head, but 
then on the other hand, poor countries also cannot find the resources to fight 
corruption effectively.31 Lambsdorff argues that corruption has a negative impact on 
the ratio of GDP to capital stock which is used as a proxy for a country‟s average 
capital productivity.32  
 
2.5.2.3. GDP growth 
Some recent studies show that corruption lowers the growth of a country‟s 
GDP. Knack and Keefer use a variable of institutional quality which, among other 
factors also including corruption, has a negative impact on GDP growth.33 Other 
studies, for example by Tanzi and Davoodi, or Mauro also come to the conclusion 
that corruption reduces the growth of GDP. 34 35  However, they do not provide a 
theoretical model that can explain why this is the case.  
On the other hand Wedeman points out that since many corrupt countries have both 
high rates of GDP growth, and also experience high levels of corruption, it seems to 
be the case that it is not the overall level of corruption as such but only certain kinds 
of corruption which have a negative influence on growth.36  
 
                                                          
30
 Gupta et al. (2002) 
31
 Paldam (2002) 
32
 Lambsdorff (2003a) 
33
 Knack and Keefer (1995) 
34
 Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) 
35
 Mauro (1997) 
36
 Wedeman (1997) 
20 
 
2.5.2.4. Investment 
Numerous studies show that corruption reduces a country‟s capital stock 
because it makes policy and commitments less credible. As a result, investors are 
frightened of putting their money into a corrupt system, so a corrupt country‟s direct 
investments decrease.  Knack and Kiefer37, Campos et al.38 or Rock and Bonnett39 
show that corruption is negatively correlated to the ratio of investment to GDP. 
Corruption‟s negative impact on FDI is found only in recent studies, for example by 
Wei40 or Henisz41. Other studies found out that some types of investment decrease 
more than others. For example Wei and Wu42 and Straub43 show that corruption has 
a negative impact on FDI but no influence on bank loans. But then, a higher reliance 
on bank loans makes a corrupt country more vulnerable to currency crises since 
loans can be withdrawn in a crisis very easily. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon that appears regardless of time, 
society and political system and has wrought enormous damage on mankind. 
Corruption happens in many different guises: from comparatively harmless bribery of 
policemen and customs officials, to far-reaching cases of kleptocrazy and state 
capture, where corruption brings whole states to the brink of collapse. The opinion 
that corruption improves society is anachronistic; the amount of recent scientific 
research describing the negative consequences of corruption is vast. The damage 
done affects the economy as a whole and touches the lives of individuals. Tracing 
the causes of corruption, which are chiefly economic, different studies come to 
different conclusions. 
                                                          
37
 Knack and Kiefer (1995) 
38
 Campos et al. (1999) 
39
 Rock and Bonnett (2004) 
40
 Wei (2000b) 
41
 Henisz (2000) 
42
 Wei and Wu (2001) 
43
 Straub (2003) 
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3. Common Law vs. Civil Law 
 
3.1. Overview 
 
The Common Law system and the Civil Law system44 are the two major legal 
systems which operate in most parts of the world. Apart from most countries in the 
Arabic region, whose legal systems are based on religious law, nearly all other 
countries, more than 70% of the world‟s population, use either the Common or the 
Civil Law systems.45 The Common Law system had its origins in England and was 
then exported to the USA, the English speaking part of Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and other former British colonies. The Civil Law system is established even 
more widely. Except for the British Isles, every European country uses a Civil Law 
system, as do all the countries of the former Soviet Union and almost all those in 
South and Central America. Some countries, such as South Africa, Israel and 
Cameroun use a system which combines elements from both systems. 46  In the 
following section, four important differences between these two systems are 
explained: the methods of evolving the law, the appointment procedures, the systems 
of checks and balances and the ways of becoming a judge.        
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 The Civil Law system is usually subdivided by legal scholars in three different subgroups: The 
Romanistic, the Germanic and the Scandinavian group. For reasons of simplicity and clearness I will 
not go into detail about the differences between these groups and all of them are included when the 
term of “Civil Law system” is used. 
45
 Koch (2003): p. 1 
46
 For more details about the geographic distribution of the law systems see 
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/rep-geo/index.php (Retrieved on 11/10/2009)   
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3.2. Differences between the Common Law and the Civil 
Law systems47 
3.2.1. Code versus Case  
The differentiation between using “codes” or “cases” when evolving the law is 
often regarded as the most significant difference between the Civil Law and the 
Common Law systems. In general, the judge in the Civil Law system relies upon 
codes and statutes when making a judgment in a case, whereas the judge in the 
Common Law system bases his/her judgment on precedents. However, the 
codification of the law is not a feature associated only with the Civil Law system, so 
are important fields of law in every single Common Law country regulated by statute. 
Further, stare decisis is not an exclusive feature of the Common Law system. Röhl 
estimates that Civil Law judges are as faithful to precedent as their Common Law 
colleges and that Common Law judges often take the opportunity to digress from 
precedent.48   
In this regard, the difference between the Common Law and the Civil Law 
system lies in another aspect, namely who creates the law. In countries with Civil 
Law systems, the legislature makes law and the judge bases his/her decisions upon 
it. In Common Law systems, on the other hand, the judge has the discretion to make 
law through creating a precedent. But it would be wrong to infer from this difference 
in the judge‟s influence on law-making that a judge in a Common Law system has 
greater influence on the quality of his/her jurisdiction. As Koch points out:  
 
“True, Common Law judges have more authority in the sense that they can evolve 
the law through precedent; whereas Civil Law judges do not have that authority. The 
Civil Law judge, however, dominates individual litigations and hence sound dispute 
resolution depends on the quality of its judges and on assuring that they have the 
wherewithal to perform their responsibilities to the best of their abilities.”49  
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3.2.2. Appointment and promotion procedures 
A major difference between the Common Law and the Civil Law systems is the 
way judges achieve office. In the Common Law system, judges are appointed by 
politicians. In Great Britain, for example, the Crown appoints High Court and senior 
judges, the former on the advice of the Lord Chancellor, the latter on the advice of 
the Prime Minister. Magistrates are appointed by the Lord Chancellor who is very 
influential in the various parts of the British judiciary and has additional tasks, which 
involve him/her in the legislative and the executive branches too.50 In the United 
States, the President has considerable influence on the judiciary. S/he has the right 
to propose Supreme Court judges, the Chief Justice, District Court judges and courts 
of appeal judges. The necessary assent of the Senate is usually forthcoming.51     
In the Civil Law system, a judge‟s appointment and promotion are usually 
apolitical.  Appointments are based on examinations of the candidate, after s/he has 
received an education that aims to prepare the candidate for a career in the judiciary. 
Promotions are granted by superiors, who choose the promoted judges according to 
criteria which usually depend on merit and seniority. The definition of merit is 
incumbent on the superiors.       
 
3.2.3. Checks and balances 
In both systems there exists a framework which regulates the way judges are 
checked and monitored. These frameworks of checks and balances in the Common 
Law system and Civil Law system are different from each other. In the Common Law 
system, lawyers are responsible for monitoring the judges, whereas in the Civil Law 
system judges monitor one another.  
 
 
                                                          
50
 For more details see: Lyall (2002) 
51
 About 20 percent of the proposed Supreme Court judges are rejected by the Senate. For more 
details see: Kovacs (1997)    
24 
 
3.2.4. Professionalism  
Koch claims that: “Perhaps the most significant distinction between the Civil 
Law model and the Common Law model is that in the former the judiciary is a corps 
of specially trained professionals”52. Judges in the Civil Law systems receive an 
education with the aim of preparing candidates for a judicial career that will usually 
last for the whole of their professional lives. Especially at the beginning of their 
careers, young judges have close relationships to senior judges who guide and 
advise them. The judge‟s promotion is usually performance-based. In the Common 
Law system, on the other hand, judges do not have such an educational path to 
follow: rather they come from a different profession. Koch underlines this point when 
he says “[…] the US judiciary is staffed by “amateur” judges largely drawn from a 
related, but in many ways dissimilar, profession, legal advocacy”53. Whether this 
difference in the typical career path of a judge in these two systems generates 
differences in the quality of the judge‟s work will not be discussed further.  
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
This short overview of the most important differences between the Common 
Law and the Civil Law systems makes no claim to be exhaustive. Tendencies 
towards a similarity in some respects can be observed and differences in the judiciary 
exist amongst countries sharing the same legal system. Nevertheless, when 
comparing the susceptibility of these two legal systems to corruption, these 
differences described above are critical when it comes to analyzing the different 
advantages and disadvantages a legal system has, in order to prevent its being 
contaminated by corruption. The differences in the appointment procedures and in 
the systems of checks and balances are of particular importance, as will be shown in 
the next chapter.  
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4. Corruption in the judiciary 
 
4.1. Overview  
 
A corrupt judiciary is one of the worst nightmares any country can suffer. A 
corrupt judiciary not only loses its ability to fight corruption but also fails to conduct 
fair trials.  According to Transparency International, “judicial corruption includes any 
inappropriate influence on the impartiality of the judicial process by any actor within 
the court system.”54 And further: “Corruption is undermining justice in many parts of 
the world, denying victims and the accused the basic human right to a fair and 
impartial trial.“55 
Since it is the role of judiciary to check and monitor other public institutions, a 
well functioning, fair and independent judiciary is absolutely necessary to fight 
corruption. A corrupt judiciary is neither fair nor independent; it harms a country and 
its society in many different ways. A corrupt judiciary is not fair and readily available 
to everybody, because personal wealth and willingness to bribe judicial staff 
determine a trial‟s outcome; unjust jurisdiction is therefore a daily occurrence.  
Governments use corrupt judiciaries to further their illegal aims, members of 
the government use it for personal purposes, undermining the separation of the 
executive and judicial branches. Judicial corruption happens at every stage of a trial, 
it “[…] extends from pre-trial activities through the trial proceedings and settlement to 
the ultimate enforcement of decisions by court bailiffs”56 Examples of such practices 
are diverse. Judges or court staff manipulate trials and court dates, evidence is 
withheld or “lost”, judicial procedures are not complied with, prosecutors or the police 
distort evidence and so on, all this to favor the party who has paid a bribe. Judicial 
failures, such as the ones mentioned, destroy society‟s trust in the judiciary and send 
a message that corruption is tolerated. A corrupt judiciary is therefore an ideal 
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breeding ground for corruption in other fields of society: it hampers economic growth 
and trade, boosts organized crime and weakens society.57  
 
4.2. Two types of judicial corruption 
Transparency International differentiates between two types of judicial 
corruption: political interference in judicial processes and bribery. 58  Political 
interference happens when judicial personnel face pressure from political forces and 
are forced to rule in favor of those forces. Usually, a corrupt judiciary facing political 
interference goes hand in hand with a corrupt political system. The problems 
emerging from political interference in the judiciary will be discussed later in some 
detail. Bribery, on the other hand, can be as systematic as political interference, but 
can also occur in a country where there is no political pressure on the judiciary. If 
there are black sheep amongst judges, lawyers or other judicial staff who accept 
bribes from litigants, they inevitably harm the quality of the judicial system severely, 
and make it seem as if the entire judicial process lacks equity and impartiality. If black 
sheep are in a minority, the judicial system maintains its functionality to fight 
corruption, inside as well as outside the judicial system, and possesses the strength 
to take assertive action against corrupt judges. Even in cases where most judges 
accept bribes, opportunities for the government to free the judiciary from corruption 
and to sustain its war on corrupt practices will thrive, as long as the government 
shows determination. If a government colludes with a corrupt judiciary, however, a 
state of political interference in the judiciary is reached. In a country where strong 
political interference is widespread, problems are severe and the battle against 
corruption is much more difficult to wage than in a system where bribery in the 
judiciary exists but politicians are not involved.      
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4.3. Causes  
There are many different causes of corruption in the judiciary. In the following 
section, an overview of the most important ones is given. It is important to notice that 
in reality, a judiciary is rarely corrupt for one single reason; usually many factors play 
a role at the same time.    
 
4.3.1. Low salaries 
Judges are more susceptible to corruption if they are poorly paid.59 The lower 
their salaries, the more easily they will be tempted to accept bribes to feather their 
own nests. Another aspect of the problem is that if salaries are low, qualified persons 
prefer taking jobs where they can earn more. The hypothesis that higher salaries in 
the judiciary will lead to lower levels of corruption is empirically verified by Voigt.60 In 
some countries, where judgeships are for sale, judges who bought themselves into 
office largely depend upon bribes to recoup their investment.61  
Rose-Ackerman states that the problem of low salaries is more likely to occur 
in Civil Law countries because: “Judges may be more vulnerable to these 
inducements in continental Europe-like systems where they have few accumulated 
assets”62. Especially in South-East-Asian countries, the poor salaries of judges and 
other judicial personnel are the principal causes of corruption in the judiciary. 63 
Empirical research, on the other hand, shows that judiciaries in some countries using 
Common-law systems also suffer from low salaries. In Bangladesh and Kenya for 
example, countries using the Common Law system, the poor salaries of judicial staff 
leads to massive amounts of illegal payments by litigants to bribe judicial staff.64  
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4.3.2. Political influence 
It may happen that a corrupt judicial system is not only tolerated, but even 
encouraged by the government. As mentioned before, in many countries all around 
the world, judicial staff face pressure from powerful political forces, to rule in their 
favor. As well as exerting political influence on the judiciary, members of the 
government can control the judiciary in many different ways. One of the most 
fundamental is through the process of appointments. If politicians are able to select 
judges not by merit, but on the basis of personal insider relationships, this may easily 
lead to the appointment of corruptible judges. Judges, appointed through nepotism, 
are more likely to take bribes and to bias their decisions in favor of the intercessor. 
This problem appears in many countries, regardless of the legal system.65  
Another way in which political influence can be exerted on the judiciary is via 
sanctions. If members of the government are able to reprimand or fire judges 
arbitrarily, independent judges are more likely to suffer recrimination than judges who 
accept bribes from governmental officials. From fear of sanctions, judges can be 
forced to act according to the will of their political masters or have to reckon with 
severe consequences. Often, political might is disguised behind quasi judicial 
institutions. In a recent case, the Algerian supreme judicial council (CSM) sanctioned 
two law officers for “falling short of their professional obligations”. What was 
supposed to look like an act of judicial self-purification, was a clear case of the 
government exercising political influence over the judiciary, since the head of state 
and the Minister of Justice chair and co-chair the CSM.66   
 
4.3.3. The law’s delay  
The prolixity of judicial processes may be an incentive for litigants to pay 
bribes to speed up procedures. In a judiciary where median times and procedural 
steps of a judicial process are excessive, corruption will be more widespread. Often, 
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a lack of judicial staff or poor working conditions for judicial personnel results in 
delays in the judicial processes. To circumvent these delays, litigants, unsurprisingly, 
may consider bribing officials to accelerate proceedings. Voigt shows that the 
hypothesis that the longer the time needed to get a court decision, the higher levels 
of judicial corruption are, holds.67 This problem is especially prevalent in India where 
in 1999, it was calculated that, given the rate of disposal at that time, the processing 
of cases pending would take 350 years, but only if no new cases entered the 
system.68 Similar problems occur in many other countries, regardless of the legal 
system they employ.  
Long duration of processes and poor working conditions are not the only 
reason for slow proceedings; judicial personnel can cause slow-downs deliberately to 
tempt litigants to bribe them. This is possible if staff control “important aspects of 
case management, such as the assignment of judges, trial dates and meetings with 
judges”69. With this power in hand, corrupt staff have numerous opportunities to 
cause delays or choose the judge at the request of their briber. If these unfair 
practices can be exercised without consequences, this is rather a consequence of a 
lack of accountability.     
 
4.3.4. Lack of accountability 
As explained above, too much political influence definitely limits the 
independence of the judge and therefore leads to corruption. On the other hand, 
however, a completely independent judiciary without any system of checks and 
balances promotes corruption too. Judges, who fear no consequences because their 
corrupt practices are not monitored, are naturally more open to bribery. A mechanism 
of checks and balances where the disciplinary body consists of judges might work 
well, if corruption in the judiciary happens rarely and very high ethical standards 
regarding corruption exist amongst judges.  
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If corruption in the judiciary is widespread or even systematic, the system of 
judges monitoring other judges will not reduce corruption. It might even make things 
worse, with judges able to organize themselves into an efficiently corrupt body, 
unchecked by political or any other power. Such a system of judges monitoring their 
peers exists for example in Guatemala, where cases of suspected corruption 
involving judicial staff are dealt with by a judicial disciplinary council, consisting of 
judges and magistrates. 70  A similar development happened in Italy, where now 
members of the judiciary elect all judges of the higher council which, in turn, decides 
on every question regarding members of the judiciary. 71  Such developments 
undermine the traditional hierarchy of the judiciary and may lead to a lower degree of 
checks and balances, which promotes opportunities to disguise acts of corruption.72 
 
4.3.5. Lack of Transparency 
Lack of transparency in the judicial system is an ideal breeding ground for 
corruption. It leads to various problems for judges to keep an overview in a confused 
system, for example if they lack access to information. This results in poor quality 
decision-making and delays. Further, insufficient transparency creates opportunities 
for judicial staff to cover up bribery; as a result corrupt judges do not have to fear 
getting caught and therefore have no incentive to stop accepting bribes. 
 Lack of transparency exists if a court‟s operations and decision-making 
processes are not or are only in part, published, if a free media does not have access 
to judicial proceedings or if the public has no chance to find out about problems and 
lapses inside the judicial system. Usually insufficient transparency goes hand in hand 
with other shortcomings in the judiciary and is more likely to occur in authoritarian 
systems. Since opacity is often created on purpose to obfuscate illegal actions, a 
perfectly functioning, independent judiciary which is free of corruption, will mostly be 
transparent too.  
                                                          
70
 Peña (2007) 
71
 Guarnieri (2007) 
72
 The number of cases of corruption arising from too much internal independence usually is the 
smaller, the more there are cases where boards of judges decide. Since the more judges decide on a 
case, the higher are the costs for bribing.     
31 
 
A lack of transparency also exists in a judicial system where the decision-
making power is concentrated in just a few hands. In such systems, more 
opportunities to decrease its transparency exist and therefore corruption thrives. This 
happens, for example if “judges concentrating a larger number of administrative and 
jurisdictional roles within their domain”73. In such a system controlling and monitoring 
judge‟s actions becomes more difficult and, as a result, opportunities to take bribes 
increase. Such a system existed in Chile and Ecuador before judicial reforms in the 
mid-nineties.74  
 
4.3.6. Organized crime 
High levels of corruption in combination with high levels of organized crime are 
especially troublesome for a society. Indeed, in many countries there exists a strong 
connection between the growth of organized crime and corruption in the public sector, 
including the judiciary. As a matter of fact, Buscaglia and van Dijk discovered that 
these two scourges reinforce one another.75 Furthermore, they have the same root. 
Levels of organized crime and corruption in the public sector depend strongly upon 
the quality of core public state institutions such as the police, the prosecution and the 
courts. This applies to any country, regardless of its state of development. The 
authors point out that “[…] high levels of organized crime and corruption are linked to 
low levels of human development… [there exists] a vicious circle of poverty exploited 
and compounded by organized crime and grand corruption…Organized crime and 
corruption prosper in an environment of bad governance”76. The strong relationship 
between organized crime and corruption confronts the judiciary with severe problems, 
but at the same time offers an excellent opportunity to kill two birds with one stone.  
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4.3.7. Further reasons 
In some countries, corruption is not recognized as something illegal but as a 
regular feature of the judicial process. In such countries, corruption is socially 
tolerated. Pepys explains that “In some countries the payment of fees for judicial 
services is so engrained that complaints arise not if a bribe is sought, but if the 
requested bribe is greater than usual”77.        
If elasticity of demand for court services is low, judicial staff have more 
opportunities to force the litigants to pay bribes. If there are no alternative and 
competing legal jurisdictions for citizens to take legal actions, litigants are at the 
staff‟s mercy: staff can demand illegal payments, because litigants have no 
alternatives to get their cases heard.  
If a judge has to decide a complex new case where no precedents exist, s/he 
may accept bribes to resolve the matter. Since there are no precedents, the corrupt 
judge cannot violate any.    
Judges threatened with physical harm may be forced to accept bribes. This 
may occur if the defendant belongs to a criminal organization or is in other respects 
very powerful. An example in recent European history was intimidation of Kosovar 
judges, forcing them to decide in favor of Kosovar defendants, even though the law 
was on the side of their Serb accusers.78     
 
4.4. The influence of the legal system on the causes of 
corruption 
Looking at the different causes of corruption in the judiciary described above, 
three aspects stand out. Firstly, most causes of judicial corruption cannot be 
assigned to any particular legal system. Secondly, the causes which can be assigned 
to the Common Law or the Civil Law systems are political influence and the lack of 
accountability. Thirdly, no cause, not even the ones which can be assigned to a legal 
                                                          
77
 Pepys (2007): p. 4f 
78
 Ibid 
33 
 
system, appears in one single legal system exclusively; this is because most causes 
are rooted in political and social factors beyond the legal system.  
 
4.4.1. Causes not assigned to a legal system 
Except for the problems of political influence and a lack of accountability, all 
other reasons cannot be assigned to a specific legal system. For most of these 
causes, this statement is straightforward. Low salaries, for example, do negatively 
affect the standard of living of a judge, resulting in a higher temptation to accept 
bribes, regardless of the legal system of which s/he is a part. A slow judiciary where 
procedures take a very long time is not caused by a specific legal system, but rather 
by a shortage of judicial personnel, out-of-date infrastructure, a lack of modern 
equipment and a lumbering bureaucracy. Further, processes in the Civil Law system 
are not per se more transparent than in the Common Law system or vice versa. The 
reasons for a lack of transparency in the judiciary are mostly deliberate, for example 
the result of not allowing access to a free media or come about from keeping a 
court‟s operations and decision processes under lock and key, which is more a 
problem of poor accountability. The strong connection between judicial corruption 
and organized crime is the fault of political and judicial failure rather than a failure of a 
particular legal system. No evidence exists that the legal system is responsible for 
the existence of organized crime syndicates. Social toleration of corruption arises 
because of political and judicial failure, regardless of the legal system, so does low 
elasticity of demand for court services. No system can protect judges from physical 
intimidation.      
 
4.4.2. Causes assigned to a legal system 
Political influence on the judiciary and a lack of accountability of the judiciary 
result in judicial corruption whether in countries use a Civil Law or a Common Law 
system. In contrast to the causes of judicial corruption explored in chapter 4.4.1, 
however, the nature of a legal system influences the occurrence of corruption caused 
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by political interference and insufficient accountability. As pointed out in chapter three, 
The Common Law and the Civil Law systems differ from each other in their 
appointment procedures and in their systems of checks and balances. These 
differences produce different levels of vulnerability to political influence on the 
judiciary, as well as cause different dangers of creating corruption related to the 
appointment system of judges.  
 
4.4.2.1. The appointment system 
A high degree of political influence on the judiciary is clearly a sign of a lack of 
external judicial independence. The Common Law system in particular can be 
criticized for having too little external judicial independence because of its 
appointments system. In the Common Law system, politicians appoint judges; 
therefore candidates who run for office may have an incentive to bribe politicians to 
get appointed by them. Furthermore, after their appointment, judges may privilege 
the political party or coalition that appointed them.79 What may look like an advantage 
of the Civil Law system in this regard changes, when there are differences in the de 
jure and the de facto judicial independence of the Civil Law system in respect to the 
appointments procedure. In the Civil Law model the process of the selection of a 
judge should be apolitical. If political forces undermine this process to take influence 
on the outcome, the system is in trouble. Because of the lack of checks, as compared 
to the Common Law system, an appointment process based on patronage is 
especially harmful. Therefore it can be said that the Common Law system surrenders 
a high degree of external independence in order to avoid problems, resulting from 
flouting of laws controlling the appointment system of judges, which can do a lot of 
harm to a legal system where the appointment is de jure apolitical. 
   
4.4.2.2. Checks and balances 
Critics of the Civil Law system often say that corruption appears more likely in 
the Civil Law system since too much power is concentrated in the judge and this 
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increases the chances for corruption. One example is the case that top-level judges 
are corrupt and as a result, only promote judges who play the corruption game too. 
So pressure is put on lower-level judges who also have to collect bribes if they wish 
to rise in the hierarchy and “fit into the system”. Furthermore senior judges can 
manipulate assignments of cases in favor of powerful clients. In a well functioning 
checks and balances system, such incidents are much less likely. Rose-Ackerman 
points out further disadvantages of the Civil Law system related to a too high degree 
of internal independence: “The lack of dissents and the low level of lay participation 
will make corruption relatively easy to hide.”80 In the Common Law system, judges 
and lawyers are able to check each other more easily which makes it harder for one 
party to accept a bribe. This argument follows the line that the Civil Law system has 
to accept a too low degree of internal and external independence in order to avoid 
any external independence at all. In the Common Law system, the advocacy checks 
the judiciary. Since the advocacy is a body outside of the judiciary, the Common Law 
system avoids too high degrees of internal independence of the judiciary, but not at 
the expense of political influence.      
But there are other views on these relations too. According to Koch, the 
system of checks and balances of the Civil Law system has advantages over the 
Common Law system. Regarding the prevention of corruption, the higher degree of 
self-regulation is an advantage. He argues that judges have several ways of 
checking their colleagues‟ behavior. If an act of corruption happens where a judge is 
involved, there is a good chance that other judges will notice and report the crime. He 
argues further that in a process under a Civil Law system usually several judges are 
involved: “…some to build the record, others to manage the litigation and others to 
bring the case to a decision. For most significant litigation both civil and criminal, the 
judges sit in panels.”81 As a result whistle blowing opportunities occur which ensures 
that integrity is maintained. This is not the case in a Common Law system, where the 
task of monitoring the judiciary for cases of judicial corruption is carried out by the 
advocacy which may not have the same insights as judges and therefore have 
disadvantages in detecting corruption in the judiciary.  
                                                          
80
 Ibid: p. 22   
81
 Koch (2003): p. 10 
36 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
A corrupt judiciary is a problem that has many different causes. Most of these, 
for example poor salaries, poor transparency or tardy judicial procedures, are not 
dependent upon the legal system a country employs. Some of these causes, 
however, are. Because of their different appointment mechanisms and different 
systems of checks and balances, the Common Law and the Civil Law systems 
present different risks of promoting a corrupt judiciary. There is no simple answer to 
the question, which of the two systems is less likely to promote corruption The Civil 
Law system surely has its advantages when it comes to the appointment processes, 
because it has better preconditions to prevent political interference with the judiciary. 
The Common Law system, on the other hand, has the advantage of a monitoring 
agency independent of the judiciary, which prevents the judiciary covering up its own 
acts of corruption. In other words, these different dangers root in a different degree of 
judicial independence: The degree of independence from the government, the so 
called external independence, on the one hand and the independence of the judges 
from their superiors, the so called internal independence, on the other hand. These 
concepts will be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
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5. Independence of the judiciary 
 
5.1. The importance of an independent judiciary 
 
 
“Whatever else courts do, we have the power  
to make the other branches of government really angry. 
 In fact, if we don‟t make them mad at least some of the time,  
we judges probably aren‟t doing our jobs.”
82
 
 
 
The function of a state‟s judiciary is to monitor the legislative and executive 
branches, control their actions for possible illegality, solve conflicts between the 
executive and the legislative and to protect citizens from unlawful and harmful actions 
by the other branches. If the judiciary does this work successfully, it plays a key role 
in reducing opportunities for other governmental departments indulge in corruption. 
Therefore, the judiciary is one of the most important institutions of state when it 
comes to fighting corruption effectively and to reducing the opportunities for bribery. 
Thereby, the independence of the judiciary is a fundamental necessity. The judiciary 
can only fulfill its function as a control-exercising institution if independence from the 
branches to control exists, or, in short, if there is “[…] independence of the judiciary 
from outside interference” 83 . In fine, judicial independence means that judges‟ 
decisions are implemented, regardless of the preferences of other branches of 
government. Further these decisions must not result in negative consequences such 
as expulsion, wage reductions or loss of influence. 
 
Division of powers is the most important requirement for an independent 
judiciary. The division of the state into the executive, legislative and judicative 
branches, with each of them having separate areas of responsibility, is of great 
importance. As soon as the division of powers erodes, the independence of the 
judiciary is in danger. Members of the legislative and executive branch must not be a 
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member of the judiciary. If there is a gray area between the powers of any two or all 
three branches of the state, the judiciary cannot work independently from the 
legislative and the executive.       
 
Generally speaking, some countries have much firmer requirements for having 
an independent judiciary than others. Looking at previous work84,85 it was found out, 
that a greater degree of judicial independence is expected in countries with a well 
functioning system of checks and balances and in countries with federal systems.  
Regarding a democratic system of horizontal checks and balances, individuals that 
hold power are limited and monitored by the judiciary. Walker argues that “Without 
these checks, countries get trapped in an „asymmetric equilibrium‟, where the 
dominant government actors […] have incentives to act beyond or outside their 
formal limits.86  
This is because in countries with a federal system, there usually are more veto 
players than in those with a unitary system. Since political power in a federal system 
is distributed over more different players, the power of any individual office-holder is 
limited, compared to the power of the office-holder in a unitary system.  
 
Next to better requirements for fighting corruption effectively, an independent 
judiciary brings other benefits to a country too. La Porta et al. found that a higher 
degree of judicial independence has a significant positive influence on several other 
indicators. The authors claim that more judicial independence is correlated to higher 
degrees of political and economic freedom and raises the property rights, the political 
rights and the human rights indices.87  
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5.2 Measuring judicial independence  
Finding a method of measuring the independence of the judiciary is a crucial 
step for anyone who wants to do empirical work on this topic. It is not enough simply 
to refer to the legal framework when analyzing the independence of the judiciary, 
since de jure assessments may differ from political reality. In the following section 
different ways of measuring judicial independence are introduced. 
The method used by Feld and Voigt is to calculate two values, one that 
measures de jure judicial independence, the other de facto judicial independence.88 
For measuring de jure independence, they value among other things characteristics 
of the constitution, judicial tenure, salaries and accessibility. For measuring de facto 
independence, the authors value among other things the effective average term 
length, changes in income and numbers of judges. Because the variables indicating 
de facto independence have to be observed over a certain period of time, the authors 
base the indicator on the period 1960-2002. This leads to problematic outcomes 
concerning the former Eastern Bloc countries all of which formulated new 
constitutions after 1990. Furthermore, the authors focus only on the supreme court of 
each country; thus they do not differentiate between different types of courts. The 
concept of de jure and de facto judicial independence will be explained more fully in 
the following section. 
A different approach to measuring the independence of the judiciary of a 
country is to look at how often the judiciary decides against the government. If the 
number is comparatively high, then the judicial system seems to work without 
pressure from the government and can therefore be regarded as relatively 
independent. A low score may indicate political pressure being brought to bear upon 
judges and can therefore be interpreted as a sign of a dependent judiciary. 
Iaryczower et al. examine judicial independence in Argentina from 1935-1998 using 
this criterion.89 They come to the conclusion that the stronger the control of the 
president over the judiciary, the smaller is the probability of judges reversing 
governmental decisions or voting against the government. Ramseyer and Rasmusen 
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use similar criteria and obtain similar results when investigating the Japanese judicial 
system.90 Even if the results look comprehensible, the used criteria can be criticized 
for being simplistic since independent courts may decide in favor of the government 
and a binary measure cannot describe the complexity of judicial decisions. 
Other approaches are for example those used by La Porta et al who measure 
the independence of the judiciary as the average of their “measures of tenure of 
supreme court judges, tenure of administrative court judges and judicial decisions as 
a source of law”.91   
 
Henisz uses the average 1985-1990 value of the variable “Law and Order” by 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).92 To rule out the cases where law and 
order are enforced through repressive policies Henisz only regarded the country-
years in which the Polity database indicated at least „slight to moderate limitations to 
executive authority“. The author admits that unfortunately problems of endogeneity 
and subjectivity may occur.  
 
5.3. Varieties of judicial independence  
 
When talking about the independence of the judiciary it is essential to mention 
that independence is not simply independence, there are important differentiations to 
be made. First the differences between de jure and de facto judicial independence 
will be explained. This differentiation is used, amongst others, in the work of Feld and 
Voigt.93  Then the difference between external and internal independence will be 
established, a concept used in the studies of Rios-Figueroa94. These differentiations 
will be very useful when examining judicial independence in the Common Law and 
Civil Law systems.   
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5.3.1. De jure and de facto judicial independence  
 
De jure independence of the judiciary can be understood as the formal laws 
that frame “[…] the position of the judiciary with respect to the other pillars of the 
political system”95. Feld and Voigt characterize the term de jure independence as 
“[…] the independence of the courts as it can be deduced from legal documents.”96 
By contrast, de facto judicial independence is defined as the “[…] independence that 
the courts factually enjoy” 97 . Essentially, this means the degree of the actual 
implementation of judicial independence which is legally stipulated. 
 
De jure and de facto independence do not necessarily appear on similar levels 
in a certain country. In two of their papers Feld and Voigt examine the relationship 
between de jure and de facto judicial independence and come to remarkable 
results.98 , 99 The authors estimated the impact of judicial independence on real GDP 
growth per capita in the period 1980-1998 and found that all countries which appear 
in the “Top Ten” of the de jure index, do not do so in the de facto index100.  What‟s 
more, Feld and Voigt found out, that de jure judicial independence turns out not to 
have a clear impact on economic growth101, whereas de facto judicial independence 
does. These findings are clear evidence that it is not sufficient simply to guarantee 
judicial independence on paper. There must also be willingness on the part of the 
politicians in power to suit their actions to the word. The most advanced laws and 
rules guaranteeing judicial independence are worthless if the party in power overrides 
them. Feld and Voigt supply a possible solution to this problem, when claiming: “It is 
necessary to shape judicial Independence by additional informal procedures that may 
be accompanied and enforced by informal social sanctions.”102 A good example that 
confirms this point of view comes from Hayo and Voigt who claim that the more 
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unstable the political situation in a country, the higher is de facto judicial 
independence. This is because protection of the judiciary from political pressures 
becomes more important if other governmental branches are exposed to social 
unrest. They point out: “This insulation is not based on formal rules, which could be 
easily adjusted after a change in government, but informal rules”103.  
 
 
5.3.2. External independence 
 
When analyzing the independence of the judiciary, one has to differentiate 
between external and internal independence. The independence of the judiciary, and 
especially the independence of Supreme Court judges, from the governmental 
branches is called external independence104.  
 
It is crucial for a judiciary to enjoy the right degree of external independence to 
effectively prevent corruption. If there is a lack of external independence, for example 
officials committing acts of corruption would either not be prosecuted at all or only 
prosecuted as a matter of form, but would not fear to get convicted of illegal actions. 
This is because a judge, who is dependent on the ruling politicians, would not decide 
against the officials whom s/he depends upon. As a consequence, the judge would 
have to fear negative, formal as well as informal, consequences for him/herself. 
Further, a lack of external independence is especially harmful regarding the 
appointment system of a judge. In most countries using the Common Law system, 
politicians have an important influence on the appointments of judges.105 This is often 
criticized as a threat to external independence of the judiciary for the reasons 
mentioned above.  
  
On the other hand, if the degree of external independence of the judiciary is 
too great, major problems occur if the judiciary is corrupt itself. Juridical personnel 
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working in a wholly independent and therefore unchecked judiciary would have 
strong incentives to demand bribes and, as a result, increase the level of corruption 
instead of reducing it. As Rios-Figueroa argues “a corrupt judiciary can facilitate high-
level corruption, undermine reforms and override legal norms”106. He further shows 
that the more autonomous the judiciary is the greater is the level of corruption in the 
country. 107 
 
This leads to the conclusion that since too much as well as too little external 
independence leads to a negative outcome, a medium level of external judicial 
independence is optimal to fight effectively against corruption.    
 
 
5.3.3. Internal independence 
 
As important as the right degree of the judiciary‟s external independence is its 
level of internal independence. Internal independence “[…] refers to the extent to 
which lower court judges can make decisions without taking into account the 
preferences of their hierarchical superiors”108. It is ascertained “by the extent and 
location of administrative controls and the extent to which judges‟ decisions are 
constrained by legal rules regarding bindingness.”109 The assumption is, that the 
greater the internal independence of the judiciary, the less are lower court judges 
monitored, and as a result, the easier it gets for them to accept bribes. On the other 
hand, too little of internal independence can also lead to problems. In a system 
where low court judges are not allowed to decide independently, only regarding their 
hierarchical superior‟s opinion and not putting their own preferences forth, can surely 
not be identified as fair and balanced. Furthermore, problems occur if these 
hierarchical superiors are corrupt themselves. People who successfully bribe superior 
court judges in a system of high internal independence hardly have to worry about 
low court judges deciding against them.     
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5.4. Reforms for an independent judiciary 
 
When aiming to reform the judiciary system so that it maintains an optimal 
degree of internal and external independence,  politicians have to detect the links 
between the judicial system and other institutions, governmental and non-
governmental alike, “[…] but also not neglect to review factors hampering 
independence within the judiciaries themselves” 110 , to find potential sources of 
pressure on the judiciary. After they are found, precise reforms need to be made to 
accomplish an independent judiciary and, as a result, free the judiciary from 
corruption. Therefore, it is especially important that potential sources of corruption 
are eradicted. This importance is stressed by Rose-Ackerman who points out that: 
“Policy must address the underlying conditions that create corrupt incentives, or it will 
have no long lasting effects.”111As one reason she emphasizes that “Powerful groups 
that lose one source of patronage will search for another vulnerable sector”.112  
 
To prevent the government being able to exert influence on judicial decisions it 
is necessary to build up mechanisms which make it very costly for the government to 
limit judicial independence. On the one hand mechanisms outside the judiciary have 
to be established which maintain judicial independence. On the other hand rules 
within the judiciary have to be established to protect it from governmental 
interference. Of course, reforms outside and inside the judiciary, are strongly 
connected. A well-organized opposition and a free press cannot lead to an 
independent judiciary if the framework within it lacks protection from “outside”. On the 
other hand, an independence-supporting framework within the judiciary is not 
sufficient in a system that has no opposition or a muzzled media.  
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5.4.1. Mechanisms outside the judiciary 
 
The most effective way to establish and maintain judicial independence from 
outside is to build up a strong opposition which can monitor governmental actions. 
This opposition can assume many forms. It can be exercised via political parties in 
parliament, via a free and critical press 113  and by citizens that can organize 
demonstrations, referendums, strikes, etc. These varied forms of opposition have to 
be free to interact with each other. As an example, it can be very difficult for citizens 
to actually recognize political interferences in the judicial independence; therefore 
they rely upon the media to be informed properly.  
Depending upon the political and social development of a country, building up 
these mechanisms can differ a lot in their expenditure of money, time and other 
resources. It can be a very hard task, especially for poor and unstable countries. But 
building up frameworks within an opposition and a free press can develop the 
benefits will stretch far beyond an independent judiciary.     
 
 
5.4.2. Rules inside the Judiciary 
 
Compared to the mechanisms outside the judiciary, establishing an 
independence-supporting framework within the judiciary is much less extensive. One 
of the most important indicators for judicial independence is whether the court‟s 
procedures are specified in a constitution. If this is the case it is a strong indicator for 
judicial independence, because constitutional law is normally more difficult to modify 
than ordinary law. As a result, if constitutional provisions, within which judges 
operate, are fixed by constitutional law, it guarantees greater independence of judges 
and prosecutors because the independence of judges crucially depends upon the 
stability of their labor conditions.  
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Furthermore, it is very important for guaranteeing judicial independence that 
appointments of judges are made by other independent bodies. The first choice of 
such independent appointers would a committee, dominated, but not controlled, by 
other judges or jurists, whereas an appointment by one single powerful politician 
such as the president, the prime minister or the minister of justice would make 
guarantee bonds for judicial independence much less credible. What a system of 
independent appointers who bring judges to office might look like will be discussed in 
the next chapter. This point of view is shared by Feld and Voigt and explained in their 
work. 114  Rios-Figueroa, however, comes to a different conclusion, claiming that 
appointment and impeachment procedures do not seem to have a significant impact 
on a country‟s level of corruption.115 
 
Another important factor determining judicial independence is the duration of 
judges‟ tenures. It increases external independence of the judiciary, if judges are 
appointed for life or up to a certain compulsory retirement age and cannot be 
removed from office. If this were not the case judges would “[…] have an incentive to 
please those who can reappoint them”116. Rios-Figueroa claims after analyzing his 
estimations that if the tenure of Supreme Court Judges is longer than that of their 
appointers, average corruption is lower.117  On the other hand, long durations of 
judges in office decreases their accountability. In the next chapter an “optimal” tenure 
will be suggested.        
 
Another important issue, that determines the level of judicial independence, is 
a judge‟s remuneration. If a judge‟s salary could not be reduced it would increase 
judicial independence because judges could make their decisions without fearing a 
salary cut. 118  Further, salaries should not be determined by members of other 
government branches because then the judge could develop an incentive to decide 
in favor of these members. Another problematic aspect of judges‟ salaries being too 
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low is pointed out by Chief Justice of the United States John Roberts in 2006 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciary. He claims that low salaries represent 
unfavorable barriers to entry for a lot of people willing to work as a judge. 
Corresponding to the fact that the salary of federal judges has in real terms since 
1969 declined 23.9%119 Roberts writes: 
 “The dramatic erosion of judicial compensation will inevitably result in a decline in 
the quality of persons willing to accept a lifetime appointment as a federal judge. Our 
judiciary will not properly serve its constitutional role if it is restricted to (1) persons so 
wealthy that they can afford to be indifferent to the level of judicial compensation, or 
(2) people for whom the judicial salary represents a pay increase.”120 
 Buscaglia brings forward a similar argument, claiming that higher salaries 
attract personnel with higher qualifications. 121  As a result, a change in judges‟ 
remuneration should require a broad legislative majority and must be valid for all 
judges, to avoid an intentional political “punishment” for a specific judge.       
       
A further criterion for an independent judiciary is its accessibility. Every citizen 
should be able to access a court when s/he experiences a violation of his/her rights. 
If this were not the case and courts could only be accessed by governmental officials, 
the judiciary would lose its independence and could not effectively protect citizens 
from official illegal actions. Limited accessibility can arise from various causes, these 
can be financial if citizens simply cannot afford to use legal services or if judges are 
permanently used to full capacity. Initiatives to increase the capacity of the courts, for 
example by employing additional judges or boosting alternative ways to settle 
disputes outside the court will play their part in increasing judicial independence.122 
When examining corruption levels in Chile and Ecuador from 1990-1996, Buscaglia 
discovered that an increase in the use of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms 
lead to a decrease in reported cases of corruption.123 
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Judicial independence is higher if there is no individual, such as a chief justice, 
responsible for the allocation of cases to the members of the court. If this is the case 
the chief justice‟s influence is very great which makes him/her especially exposed to 
corruptive actions compared to the situation where a general rule administers the 
allocation of cases.  
 
In countries where the constitutional court is within the judiciary corruption is 
higher than in countries where it stands outside it. Latter countries experience lower 
levels of corruption, if the number of Supreme Court judges is specified in the 
constitution.” For countries with the constitutional court within the judiciary, if the 
judiciary itself controls its institutional structure corruption is less than if this is not the 
case.”124  
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
          Similar to the causes of corruption, most of the reforms designed to bring more 
independence to the judiciary are not dependent upon the legal system. Mechanisms 
outside of the judiciary, for example a free press or a well-informed and organized 
society, can be established and promoted regardless of the legal system. Most of the 
proposed rules inside the judiciary are not connected with the legal system either. 
Procedures that are fixed by constitutional law, rules about the length of a judge‟s 
term, rules concerning who determines judges‟ salaries, a high degree of accessibility 
by the public can all be established in the Common Law and the Civil Law system 
alike. Nor does the position of the constitutional court depend upon the legal system. 
The appointment system, on the other hand, is indeed different in the Common Law 
and the Civil Law systems. An appointment system where neither politicians exert 
great influence, nor judges decide on their own, is a mixture between the traditional 
appointment systems of the Common Law and the Civil Law systems. In some 
countries such systems exist. These systems are a very important feature of a model 
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that tries to establish a judiciary with “ideal” degrees of internal and external 
independence which will be presented in the next chapter.    
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6. Searching for an “ideal” model of an 
independent judiciary 
 
 
6.1. Overview 
 
Having established what is meant by the terms “de jure” and “de facto”, 
“internal” and “external” judicial independence respectively, and considered the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Common Law and Civil Law systems in terms 
of their susceptibility to corruption and having taken a look at some of the reforms 
that might help establishing an independent judiciary, the question left to ask, is 
whether it is possible to frame mechanisms that would guarantee a judicial system 
possessing an “ideal” degree of internal and external independence. Such a system 
would have optimal qualifications to combat corruption effectively.   
 
In the first place, such a system needs to incorporate an optimal degree of 
both internal and external independence. As explained above, neither too much, nor 
too little external independence benefits a judiciary‟s power to fight corruption and 
prevents its protagonists becoming corrupt themselves. The same holds true for 
internal independence. Secondly, these optimal degrees of independence must be 
adhered to, which means that de facto judicial independence is essential. Since Feld 
and Voigt showed, as described above, that the degrees of de facto and de jure 
judicial independence often differ within a country, a high degree of de jure 
independence is desirable but not necessarily required.   
 
In the following sections, an attempt is made to describe the features of such 
an “ideal” system. First of all, the commission system of judicial selection is 
introduced. Jackson argues that only this model of a selection system guarantees 
that the best degree of judicial external independence is achieved. In his paper, he 
describes how to balance judicial independence and accountability. The “Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct” deal with this problem from the judge‟s perspective. 
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These principles are a set of recommendations that aim to give advice to judges, 
about what they can do themselves to reach optimal degrees of internal and external 
independence.      
 
6.2. The commission system of judicial selection  
The process of judicial selection plays a very important role in successful 
efforts to select the most qualified judges. Jackson claims that the commission 
system of judicial selection offers the best preconditions for this. This system 
attempts to strike the right balance between keeping the selection process as free 
from political influence as possible whilst preserving some judicial accountability. 
Various versions of the commission system of judicial selection are currently in 
operation. Most widely used is the “Missouri Plan”. Under this system, three 
candidates are selected by a non-partisan committee; the governor is notified of the 
selection and appoints one of them. The “Missouri Plan” also includes a retention 
election, for judges who have served for at least one year. These elections take place 
at the next general election.125 Through these features political independence on the 
one hand and accountability on the other, are guaranteed and accorded equal weight.  
Other versions of the commission system of judicial selection regard political 
independence as more important. An example is the version used for the election of 
Supreme Court judges in the American state of Rhode Island, where Supreme Court 
judges serve for life. Some systems pay particular attention to greater accountability, 
putting up with political independence. One example is the system used in the New 
York‟s Court of Appeals, where the commission and the governor have to reappoint 
the judge who wishes to retain office; the approval of the senate is also required.  
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6.2.1. Five principles for an optimal commission system  
In order to find an “optimal” version of a commission system of judicial 
selection, with regard to maximizing the quality of the appointed judge, Jackson 
states five principles that must figure in an ideal selection system: independence, 
accountability, representativeness, legitimacy and transparency.126 Since this article 
deals with the different reasons for susceptibility of the Common Law and the Civil 
Law systems to corruption, the principles of independence and accountability are of 
particular interest here. 127  As seen above, every commission system of judicial 
selection faces the problem that independence and accountability are opposed. 
Every rule that emphasizes one of these two principles automatically undercuts the 
other. Therefore, a single “optimal” selection process does not exist; rather there is 
an “optimal range” of commission systems with verifying degrees of independence 
and accountability. Analyzing these two principles separately is not feasible.   
 
6.2.2. Independence and accountability 
Systems included in the “optimal range” of commission systems of judicial 
selection have to guarantee that the degree of external independence is at a level 
where neither political actors, nor political groups have enough power to appoint 
judges without the approval of other persons or groups having the right to vote in the 
appointment of the judge, nor should politicians be able to exert excessive pressure 
on judges from outside. The judge should not have to fear losing his/her job or any 
other sanctions if his/her decisions do not correspond to the will of a powerful 
politician and decisions must not be swayed by political pressure. 
 
Jackson describes judicial accountability as “the “opposite side” of the coin 
from judicial independence [because] any measure of accountability necessarily 
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limits judicial independence.”128 So, as explained above, a system inside the optimal 
range strikes the balance between independence and accountability rather than 
trying to maximize both. The degree of judicial accountability should be high enough 
to provide opportunities to remove judges if they are involved in illegal actions, 
otherwise they are not worthy of their profession. 
 
Jackson explains that the question about the right degree of independence and 
accountability is important in three areas of the commission systems of judicial 
selection: “1) the makeup and procedure of the selection commission and its 
relationship to the appointing authority, 2) the length of term judges serve, and 3) the 
retention mechanism involved.”129 
 
6.2.2.1. The selection commission 
 
The way the selection commission is composed and related to the appointed 
authority offers different possibilities of adjusting the degrees of independence and 
accountability. To prevent political forces having enough power to appoint judges 
without the approval of others, the composition of the commission should be as 
diverse as possible. The more different groups are represented in the nominating 
commission, the harder it becomes for one group to be able to decide alone. 
Furthermore, the judges appointed would not have to feel under an obligation to a 
particular group and therefore be less obliged to decide in their favor. The nominating 
authority should neither have the right to select any members of the nominating 
commission, nor to refuse all of the proposed candidates. The selection commission 
in Israel fulfills these criteria to a considerable extent. Of the nine members of the 
commission, non-politicians outnumber politicians five to four, members of the three 
governmental branches as well as members of the legal profession form the 
commission. The three Supreme Court judges form the largest group within the 
commission. The president‟s task of appointing the judges is simply a formal one.130  
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Colquitt describes in his work three features, an ideal selection commission 
should possess: fidelity to democratic principles, maintaining independence and 
actively striving for public support. Political elites should play no part in a truly 
democratic system and the courts they are responsible for should reside within the 
same judicial districts. External and internal independence is also an issue. No 
politician should have influence on the commission from outside, for example, by 
having the right to elect its members, nor should a single member or group inside the 
commission have enough power to decide policy de facto alone. A further way of 
increasing external independence is to extend the length of terms of office for the 
members of the commission. However, this could lead to a reduction of accountability 
and therefore increase internal independence excessively. If the public recognizes 
the commissions‟ holding to democratic ideals and independence, it will be more 
willing to support the selection commission. What‟s more, the commissions‟ public 
credibility will be high if it is open to the people. On the one hand, this involves public 
relations work. Colquitt gives various examples for that:  
 
“…establishing a public speakers‟ bureau of commissioners (and possibly judges and 
attorneys) to explain the commission‟s role to interested groups, having 
commissioners interviewed by the media, disseminating public service 
announcements about the commission and its activities, and, when possible, 
conducting its business in open proceedings to which the public has been invited.”131    
 
On the other hand, the public must also be able to exert control over the 
commission. This can happen through regulation, reviews or sanctions in cases of 
misbehavior.  
 
6.2.2.2. Length of term 
 
The length of term a judge serves is a very good indicator of the degrees of 
independence and accountability. Shorter tenure offers greater accountability, 
because opportunities to remove judges happen more frequently. The longer the 
tenure, the greater is the degree of judicial independence. Jackson argues that the 
optimal tenure is six to eight years. This period “strike[s] a balance between allowing 
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judges enough time so that their performance on the bench can be evaluated, and 
allowing the public an opportunity to exercise its right to evaluate its judges.”132 
 
 
6.2.2.3. Retention mechanism 
 
Two types of retention mechanisms are used in commission systems: “non-
partisan retention elections and reappointment by the same or similar method as 
selection”. 133  The non-partisan retention system attaches greater importance to 
accountability, because in this system accountability is provided directly and not 
through representatives. On the other hand it lacks political independence, since 
judges may be subjected to political processes in their retention races. In the 
reappointment system, accountability is transferred from the public to elected officials, 
decreasing both the accountability and independence of judges. The most important 
feature, however that both systems should have is that an independent evaluation 
commission exists, that can provide unbiased information about a judge‟s work and 
performance.    
 
 
6.3. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 
 
6.3.1. Overview 
The “Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct” are a code of ethical guidelines which 
aim to give a judge recommendations how to behave in his/her job. The Principles 
were framed by a group of senior judges who form the “Judicial Group on 
Strengthening Judicial Integrity” in 2002. All these senior judges come from Asian 
and African Common Law countries. The Principles recognize the active role and the 
responsibility of the judiciary when it comes to maintaining their own independence 
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and integrity. When following these guidelines, judges lay optimal foundations to 
prevent damage arising from the illegal exertion of influence from inside and outside 
the judiciary.    
 
6.3.2. Core values 
The Bangalore Principles expound six core values every judge should comply 
with: independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality and competence and 
diligence. 
 
6.3.2.1. Independence 
The Principles describe judicial independence as a pre-requisite for judicial 
disinterestedness. Judicial independence implies that judges shall be “free of any 
extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or 
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason134“. It is also stressed that judges should 
strive actively for independence.  Furthermore, the importance of public confidence in 
the judiciary is emphasized, because this is quintessential for the preservation of an 
independent judiciary. 
 
6.3.2.2. Impartiality 
Impartiality is also a very important feature a judge must exhibit if he wishes to 
be fair and independent. The Principles point out that impartiality “applies not only to 
the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made”135. To 
maintain impartiality, a judge should conduct his/her duties in a fair and unbiased 
fashion and should avoid any action that would cause anyone to be in doubt about 
his/her impartiality. 
 
 
                                                          
134
 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), p. 3 
135
 Ibid, p. 3 
57 
 
6.3.2.3. Integrity 
Integrity is also a feature of high importance. The Principles state that a 
judge‟s conduct should be above reproach and his actions “must not merely be done 
but must also be seen to be done”136. 
 
6.3.2.4. Propriety 
A judge‟s job entails permanent public scrutiny, so a judge has to behave 
correspondingly. The Principles insists that a judge must avoid any action which 
might cast doubt upon his/her propriety. This includes for example, not participating 
in any case where a member of the judge‟s family is involved, avoiding any action 
that could be regarded as corrupt or using his/her social position for advancing 
private interests. 
 
6.3.2.5. Equality 
A judge must always treat everyone equally, regardless of race, sex, religion, 
profession and similar characteristics. Then, and only then, can a judge be said to be 
independent and of integrity.  
    
6.3.2.6. Competence and Diligence 
The Principles point out that a competent and diligent judge must value his 
duties above all other activities, must keep himself/herself informed about 
developments in international affairs, must continually broaden his/her horizons and 
should avoid all conduct which is incompatible with the conscientious exercise of 
his/her duties.  
 
6.3.3. Criticism 
Mayne points out two weaknesses in the Bangalore Principles. In the first 
place, the principles “are not contained in a binding document under international 
law”137.  The principles have been created outside the UN processes; they are not 
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 Mayne (2007): p. 43 
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binding on any state since they form part of no international treaty. Therefore the 
scope of the Bangalore Principles is limited. Secondly, the Principles may not 
improve judicial conduct directly, because they do not set out enforceable rules but 
are merely non-binding guidance. They are not written in a way that “enables their 
direct application or incorporation into domestic law as enforceable rules of 
conduct138”. Furthermore, they do not specify any consequences or penalties in case 
of violation.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
The commission system of judicial selection and the Bangalore principles are 
systems designed to establish mechanisms that will keep the judiciary free from 
political influence, but at the same time keep the judiciary accountable. Whereas the 
former is a system that is already established in some parts of the world, the latter is 
a collection of recommendations that, so far, has a de jure influence on the judiciary 
of 10 countries.139 Combining these two systems, however, would lead to a legal 
system where many opportunities for corruption because of political influence or a 
lack of accountability would be eliminated. Politicians‟ influence on the appointment 
of judges would be greatly reduced, limiting external influence in the appointment 
procedures to a minimum. Extensive pressure on judges, from outside as well as 
from inside the judiciary, would be prevented by application of the Bangalore 
principles.   
A further feature of an “ideal” legal system would be a mechanism of 
“permanent accountability” which gave the public a mechanism for evaluating the 
performance of a judge permanently and set in place sanctions if a judge 
misbehaved. To establish such a system without allowing additional political pressure 
on the judiciary is very difficult, however.140 Establishing a commission responsible 
                                                          
138
 Ibid: p. 43 
139
 „The Bangalore Principles are being used either as a basis for the development of a code or to 
revise existing codes in Mauritius, the Netherlands, England and Wales, Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, Serbia 
and Jordan and have been adopted in Belize and the Philippines.” Mayne (2007): p. 42 
140
 To my knowledge, systems where judges are only, or at least to a great extend, permanently 
accountable by the people, does not exist.  
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for monitoring the judiciary might be a more satisfactory solution than entrusting 
lawyers with the task of monitoring the judiciary, as is the case in the Common Law 
system. But then again, two questions occur: who would appoint the commission and 
who would monitor it? As soon as politicians are allowed to influence the appointment 
or the monitoring of such a commission, political influence can be exerted on the 
judiciary. A possible solution would be to entrust the selection commission with the 
task of monitoring of the judiciary. Since the power of this commission would be 
enormous, the more important it would be to create well-functioning mechanisms that 
allowed the public to check the commission‟s work.  
As pointed out in chapter five, the question of whether the Common Law or the 
Civil Law system has more effective mechanisms to prevent infiltration by corruption 
cannot easily be answered. Each system has its advantages and drawbacks, 
grounded on its different preferences regarding internal and external independence. 
The features explained above try to combine the two systems‟ advantages into 
mechanisms that promote “optimal” degrees of internal and external independence. 
These mechanisms are independent from other characteristics of a legal system; 
therefore they can be applied to both, the Common Law and the Civil Law systems. 
Even though the commission system of judicial selection is used in many judiciaries 
in countries using the Common Law system, there is no reason why such a selection 
system should not work is Civil Law countries too. Even though the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct were formulated by Common Law judges, these 
guidelines are not inconsistent with any feature of Civil Law practice.  
The mechanism of “permanent public accountability”, on the other hand, is 
neither consistent with the Common Law system, nor with the Civil Law system. If 
this mechanism were used in Common Law or Civil Law systems, the responsibility 
for monitoring the judiciary would be transferred from lawyers and the judiciary 
respectively, to the public. For both types of legal systems such a shift in 
responsibility would significantly change the nature of the systems.  
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7. Final Conclusion 
 
A corrupt judiciary causes massive harm to a country and its society. Various 
reasons for corruption in the judiciary exist. Two of these reasons, excessive political 
influence and insufficient accountability, are strongly connected to the features of the 
legal system a judiciary works within. There are many sources for corruption in the 
judiciary, however, which are not connected to any special feature of either the 
Common Law or the Civil Law systems, like low salaries or long durations of judicial 
processes. Therefore the legal systems‟ influence on corruption in the judiciary is 
limited. 
There is no clear evidence that one of the legal systems has better 
requirements to prevent corruption in the judiciary. Neither system systematically 
fosters corruption in the judiciary. Compared to the Civil law system, the Common 
Law system is better in terms of avoiding too high internal independence of the 
judiciary because lawyers monitor the judges, but it implicates higher political 
influence, because of its appointment and promotion procedures. An “ideal” model of 
an independent judiciary, such as the one introduced in chapter six, must combine 
the different advantages of the Common Law and the Civil Law systems, thus 
establishing optimal degrees of internal and external independence. But then again, 
such an “ideal” model is not sufficient to eliminate corruption in the judiciary, since 
only some sources of corruption in the judiciary result from wrong degrees of internal 
and external independence. Additional reforms must be carried out to free the 
judiciary from corruption. This is only possible, however, if the government is willing 
to do so and if enough resources are raised. To free the judiciary from corruption is 
very costly and usually comes along with resistance from those utilizing a corrupt 
judiciary. But only a judiciary free of corruption obtains fair trials and fights corruption 
in other parts of the state. Therefore eradicating corruption in the judiciary is one of 
the most important measures when aiming to free a country from corruption.     
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A Appendix  
 
A. 1 Corruption Perceptions Index 2008
141
 
 
2008 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX  
country 
country 
2008 CPI surveys 
confidence range 
rank score
142
 used
143
 
1 Denmark  9,3 6 9.1 - 9.4  
1 New Zealand  9,3 6 9.2 - 9.5  
1 Sweden  9,3 6 9.2 - 9.4  
4 Singapore  9,2 9 9.0 - 9.3  
5 Finland  9 6 8.4 - 9.4  
5 Switzerland  9 6 8.7 - 9.2  
7 Iceland  8,9 5 8.1 - 9.4  
7 Netherlands  8,9 6 8.5 - 9.1  
9 Australia  8,7 8 8.2 - 9.1  
9 Canada  8,7 6 8.4 - 9.1  
11 Luxembourg  8,3 6 7.8 - 8.8  
12 Austria  8,1 6 7.6 - 8.6  
12 Hong Kong  8,1 8 7.5 - 8.6  
14 Germany  7,9 6 7.5 - 8.2  
14 Norway  7,9 6 7.5 - 8.3  
16 Ireland  7,7 6 7.5 - 7.9  
16 United Kingdom  7,7 6 7.2 - 8.1  
18 Belgium  7,3 6 7.2 - 7.4  
18 Japan  7,3 8 7.0 - 7.6  
18 USA  7,3 8 6.7 - 7.7  
21 Saint Lucia  7,1 3 6.6 - 7.3  
22 Barbados  7 4 6.5 - 7.3  
23 Chile  6,9 7 6.5 - 7.2  
23 France  6,9 6 6.5 - 7.3  
                                                          
141
 Source: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 Retrieved on 
11/10/2009 
142
 The score ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) 
143
 13 different polls and surveys from 11 independent institutions are used.  
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23 Uruguay  6,9 5 6.5 - 7.2  
26 Slovenia  6,7 8 6.5 - 7.0  
27 Estonia  6,6 8 6.2 - 6.9  
28 Qatar  6,5 4 5.6 - 7.0  
28 
Saint Vincent and the 
6,5 3 4.7 - 7.3  
Grenadines  
28 Spain  6,5 6 5.7 - 6.9  
31 Cyprus  6,4 3 5.9 - 6.8  
32 Portugal  6,1 6 5.6 - 6.7  
33 Dominica  6 3 4.7 - 6.8  
33 Israel  6 6 5.6 - 6.3  
35 United Arab Emirates  5,9 5 4.8 - 6.8  
36 Botswana  5,8 6 5.2 - 6.4  
36 Malta  5,8 4 5.3 - 6.3  
36 Puerto Rico  5,8 4 5.0 - 6.6  
39 Taiwan  5,7 9 5.4 - 6.0  
40 South Korea  5,6 9 5.1 - 6.3  
41 Mauritius  5,5 5 4.9 - 6.4  
41 Oman  5,5 5 4.5 - 6.4  
43 Bahrain  5,4 5 4.3 - 5.9  
43 Macau  5,4 4 3.9 - 6.2  
45 Bhutan  5,2 5 4.5 - 5.9  
45 Czech Republic  5,2 8 4.8 - 5.9  
47 Cape Verde  5,1 3 3.4 - 5.6  
47 Costa Rica  5,1 5 4.8 - 5.3  
47 Hungary  5,1 8 4.8 - 5.4  
47 Jordan  5,1 7 4.0 - 6.2  
47 Malaysia  5,1 9 4.5 - 5.7  
52 Latvia  5 6 4.8 - 5.2  
52 Slovakia  5 8 4.5 - 5.3  
54 South Africa  4,9 8 4.5 - 5.1  
55 Italy  4,8 6 4.0 - 5.5  
55 Seychelles  4,8 4 3.7 - 5.9  
57 Greece  4,7 6 4.2 - 5.0  
58 Lithuania  4,6 8 4.1 - 5.2  
58 Poland  4,6 8 4.0 - 5.2  
58 Turkey  4,6 7 4.1 - 5.1  
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61 Namibia  4,5 6 3.8 - 5.1  
62 Croatia  4,4 8 4.0 - 4.8  
62 Samoa  4,4 3 3.4 - 4.8  
62 Tunisia  4,4 6 3.5 - 5.5  
65 Cuba  4,3 4 3.6 - 4.8  
65 Kuwait  4,3 5 3.3 - 5.2  
67 El Salvador  3,9 5 3.2 - 4.5  
67 Georgia  3,9 7 3.2 - 4.6  
67 Ghana  3,9 6 3.4 - 4.5  
70 Colombia  3,8 7 3.3 - 4.5  
70 Romania  3,8 8 3.4 - 4.2  
72 Bulgaria  3,6 8 3.0 - 4.3  
72 China  3,6 9 3.1 - 4.3  
72 Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of)  3,6 6 2.9 - 4.3  
72 Mexico  3,6 7 3.4 - 3.9  
72 Peru  3,6 6 3.4 - 4.1  
72 Suriname  3,6 4 3.3 - 4.0  
72 Swaziland  3,6 4 2.9 - 4.3  
72 Trinidad and Tobago  3,6 4 3.1 - 4.0  
80 Brazil  3,5 7 3.2 - 4.0  
80 Burkina Faso  3,5 7 2.9 - 4.2  
80 Morocco  3,5 6 3.0 - 4.0  
80 Saudi Arabia  3,5 5 3.0 - 3.9  
80 Thailand  3,5 9 3.0 - 3.9  
85 Albania  3,4 5 3.3 - 3.4  
85 India  3,4 10 3.2 - 3.6  
85 Madagascar  3,4 7 2.8 - 4.0  
85 Montenegro  3,4 5 2-5 - 4.0  
85 Panama  3,4 5 2.8 - 3.7  
85 Senegal  3,4 7 2.9 - 4.0  
85 Serbia  3,4 6 3.0 - 4.0  
92 Algeria  3,2 6 2.9 - 3.4  
92 Bosnia and Herzegovina  3,2 7 2.9 - 3.5  
92 Lesotho  3,2 5 2.3 - 3.8  
92 Sri Lanka  3,2 7 2.9 - 3.5  
96 Benin  3,1 6 2.8 - 3.4  
96 Gabon  3,1 4 2.8 - 3.3  
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96 Guatemala  3,1 5 2.3 - 4.0  
96 Jamaica  3,1 5 2.8 - 3.3  
96 Kiribati  3,1 3 2.5 - 3.4  
96 Mali  3,1 6 2.8 - 3.3  
102 Bolivia                3.0  6 2.8 - 3.2  
102 Djibouti  3 4 2.2 - 3.3  
102 Dominican Republic  3 5 2.7 - 3.2  
102 Lebanon  3 4 2.2 - 3.6  
102 Mongolia  3 7 2.6 - 3.3  
102 Rwanda  3 5 2.7 - 3.2  
102 Tanzania  3 7 2.5 - 3.3  
109 Argentina  2,9 7 2.5 - 3.3  
109 Armenia  2,9 7 2.6 - 3.1  
109 Belize  2,9 3 1.8 - 3.7  
109 Moldova  2,9 7 2.4 - 3.7  
109 Solomon Islands  2,9 3 2.5 - 3.2  
109 Vanuatu  2,9 3 2.5 - 3.2  
115 Egypt  2,8 6 2.4 - 3.2  
115 Malawi  2,8 6 2.4 - 3.1  
115 Maldives  2,8 4 1.7 - 4.3  
115 Mauritania  2,8 7 2.2 - 3.7  
115 Niger  2,8 6 2.4 - 3.0  
115 Zambia  2,8 7 2.5 - 3.0  
121 Nepal  2,7 6 2.4 - 3.0  
121 Nigeria  2,7 7 2.3 - 3.0  
121 Sao Tome and Principe  2,7 3 2.1 - 3.1  
121 Togo  2,7 6 1.9 - 3.7  
121 Viet Nam  2,7 9 2.4 - 3.1  
126 Eritrea  2,6 5 1.7 - 3.6  
126 Ethiopia  2,6 7 2.2 - 2.9  
126 Guyana  2,6 4 2.4 - 2.7  
126 Honduras  2,6 6 2.3 - 2.9  
126 Indonesia  2,6 10 2.3 - 2.9  
126 Libya  2,6 5 2.2 - 3.0  
126 Mozambique  2,6 7 2.4 - 2.9  
126 Uganda  2,6 7 2.2 - 3.0  
134 Comoros  2,5 3 1.9 - 3.0  
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134 Nicaragua  2,5 6 2.2 - 2.7  
134 Pakistan  2,5 7 2.0 - 2.8  
134 Ukraine  2,5 8 2.2 - 2.8  
138 Liberia  2,4 4 1.8 - 2.8  
138 Paraguay  2,4 5 2.0 - 2.7  
138 Tonga  2,4 3 1.9 - 2.6  
141 Cameroon  2,3 7 2.0 - 2.7  
141 Iran  2,3 4 1.9 - 2.5  
141 Philippines  2,3 9 2.1 - 2.5  
141 Yemen  2,3 5 1.9 - 2.8  
145 Kazakhstan  2,2 6 1.8 - 2.7  
145 Timor-Leste  2,2 4 1.8 - 2.5  
147 Bangladesh  2,1 7 1.7 - 2.4  
147 Kenya  2,1 7 1.9 - 2.4  
147 Russia  2,1 8 1.9 - 2.5  
147 Syria  2,1 5 1.6 - 2.4  
151 Belarus  2 5 1.6 - 2.5  
151 Central African Republic  2 5 1.9 - 2.2  
151 Côte d´Ivoire  2 6 1.7 - 2.5  
151 Ecuador  2 5 1.8 - 2.2  
151 Laos  2 6 1.6 - 2.3  
151 Papua New Guinea  2 6 1.6 - 2.3  
151 Taijikistan  2 8 1.7 - 2.3  
158 Angola  1,9 6 1.5 - 2.2  
158 Azerbaijan  1,9 8 1.7 - 2.1  
158 Burundi  1,9 6 1.5 - 2.3  
158 Congo, Republic  1,9 6 1.8 - 2.0  
158 Gambia  1,9 5 1.5 - 2.4  
158 Guinea-Bissau  1,9 3 1.8 - 2.0  
158 Sierra Leone  1,9 5 1.8 - 2.0  
158 Venezuela  1,9 7 1.8 - 2.0  
166 Cambodia  1,8 7 1.7 - 1.9  
166 Kyrgyzstan  1,8 7 1.7 - 1.9  
166 Turkmenistan  1,8 5 1.5 - 2.2  
166 Uzbekistan  1,8 8 1.5 - 2.2  
166 Zimbabwe  1,8 7 1.5 - 2.1  
171 Congo, Democratic Republic  1,7 6 1.6 - 1.9  
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171 Equatorial Guinea  1,7 4 1.5 - 1.8  
173 Chad  1,6 6 1.5 - 1.7  
173 Guinea  1,6 6 1.3 - 1.9  
173 Sudan  1,6 6 1.5 - 1.7  
176 Afghanistan  1,5 4 1.1 - 1.6  
177 Haiti  1,4 4 1.1 - 1.7  
178 Iraq  1,3 4 1.1 - 1.6  
178 Myanmar  1,3 4 1.0 - 1.5  
180 Somalia  1 4 0.5 - 1.4 
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A.2 Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities and 
Corresponding Legal Systems
144
 
 
Political Entities Legal Systems Mixed systems Components 
   
AFGHANISTAN Muslim 
 
ALBANIA Civil Law 
 
ALGERIA Mixed Civil Law/Muslim 
ANDORRA Customary 
 
ANGOLA Civil Law 
 
ANGUILLA (UK) Common Law 
 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA Common Law 
 
ARGENTINA Civil Law 
 
ARMENIA Civil Law 
 
ARUBA (NL) Civil Law 
 
AUSTRALIA (AU) Common Law 
 
AUSTRIA Civil Law 
 
AZERBAIJAN Civil Law 
 
AZORES (PG) Civil Law 
 
BAHAMAS Common Law 
 
BAHRAIN Mixed 
Muslim/Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary law 
BANGLADESH Mixed Muslim/Common Law 
BARBADOS Common Law 
 
BELARUS Civil Law 
 
BELGIUM Civil Law 
 
BELIZE Common Law 
 
BENIN Civil Law 
 
BERMUDA (UK) Common Law 
 
BHUTAN Mixed Customary/Common Law 
BOLIVIA Civil Law 
 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Civil Law 
 
BOTSWANA Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
BRAZIL Civil Law 
 
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN 
TERRITORY (UK) 
Common Law 
 
BRITISH TERRITORIES OF 
ANTARTICA (UK) 
Common Law 
 
BRUNEI Mixed Muslim/Common Law/Customary 
BULGARIA Civil Law 
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BURKINA FASO Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
BURUNDI Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
CAMBODIA Civil Law 
 
CAMEROON Mixed 
Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary 
CANADA (CD) (minus QUEBEC) Common Law 
 
CANARY ISLANDS (SP) Civil Law 
 
CAPE VERDE Civil Law 
 
CAYMANS- (UK) Common Law 
 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Civil Law 
 
CHAD Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
CHILE Civil Law 
 
CHINA (CN) (minus H-K and MACAU) Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
COLOMBIA Civil Law 
 
COMOROS Mixed Civil Law/Muslim 
CONGO Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
CONGO, POPULAR DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
COOK ISLANDS (NZ) Common Law 
 
COSTA RICA Civil Law 
 
COTE D'IVOIRE Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
CROATIA Civil Law 
 
CUBA Civil Law 
 
CYPRUS Mixed Common Law/Civil Law 
CZECH REPUBLIC Civil Law 
 
DENMARK (DK) Civil Law 
 
DJIBOUTI Mixed Civil Law/Muslim/Customary 
DOMINICA Common Law 
 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Civil Law 
 
EAST TIMOR Mixed Civil Law/Muslim/Customary 
ECUADOR Civil Law 
 
EGYPT Mixed Muslim/Civil Law 
EL SALVADOR Civil Law 
 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
ERITREA Mixed Civil Law/Customary/Muslim 
ESTONIA Civil Law 
 
ETHIOPIA Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
FAROE ISLANDS (DK) Civil Law 
 
FIJI ISLANDS Common Law 
 
FINLAND Civil Law 
 
FRANCE (FR) Civil Law 
 
FRENCH GUYANA (FR) Civil Law 
 
FRENCH POLYNESIA (FR) Civil Law 
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FRENCH SOUTHERN AND 
ANTARCTIC LANDS (FR) 
Civil Law 
 
GABON Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
GAMBIA Mixed Muslim/Common Law/Customary 
GEORGIA Civil Law 
 
GERMANY Civil Law 
 
GHANA Mixed Common Law/Customary 
GIBRALTAR (UK) Common Law 
 
GREECE Civil Law 
 
GRENADA Common Law 
 
GREENLAND (DK) Civil Law 
 
GUADELOUPE (FR) Civil Law 
 
GUAM (USA) Common Law 
 
GUATEMALA Civil Law 
 
GUERNSEY (UK) Customary 
 
GUINEA Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
GUINEA-BISSAU Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
GUYANA Mixed Common Law/Civil Law 
HAITI Civil Law 
 
HAWAII (USA) Common Law 
 
HONDURAS Civil Law 
 
HONG KONG (CN) Mixed Common Law/Customary 
HUNGARY Civil Law 
 
ICELAND Civil Law 
 
INDIA Mixed Common Law/Muslim/Customary 
INDONESIA Mixed Civil Law/Muslim/Customary 
IRAN Mixed Muslim/Civil Law 
IRAQ Mixed Civil Law/Muslim  
IRELAND Common Law 
 
ISRAEL Mixed 
Civil Law/Common 
Law/Jewish/Muslim 
ITALY Civil Law 
 
JAMAICA Common Law 
 
JAPAN Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
JERSEY (UK) Customary 
 
JORDAN Mixed Civil Law/Muslim/Customary 
KAZAKHSTAN Civil Law 
 
KENYA Mixed Common Law/Customary /Muslim 
KIRIBATI Common Law 
 
KOREA NORTH Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
KOREA SOUTH Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
KUWAIT Mixed Muslim/Civil Law/Customary 
KYRGYZSTAN Civil Law 
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LAOS Civil Law 
 
LATVIA Civil Law 
 
LEBANON Mixed Civil Law/Muslim 
LESOTHO Mixed 
Common Law/Civil 
Law/Customary 
LIBERIA Mixed Common Law/Customary  
LIBYA Mixed Muslim/Civil Law 
LIECHTENSTEIN Civil Law 
 
LITHUANIA Civil Law 
 
LOUISIANA (USA) Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
LUXEMBOURG Civil Law 
 
MACAU (CN) Civil Law 
 
MACEDONIA (FYROM) Civil Law 
 
MADAGASCAR Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
MADEIRA (PG) Civil Law 
 
MALAWI Mixed Common Law/Customary 
MALAYSIA Mixed Muslim/Common Law/Customary 
MALDIVES ISLANDS Muslim 
 
MALI Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
MALOUINES/FALKLAND ISLES (UK) Common Law 
 
MALTA Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
MAN ISLE OF (UK) Common Law 
 
MARIANA (USA) Common Law 
 
MARSHALL ISLANDS Common Law 
 
MARTINIQUE (FR) Civil Law 
 
MAURITANIA Mixed Muslim/Civil Law 
MAURITIUS Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
MAYOTTE ISLAND (FR) Civil Law 
 
MEXICO Civil Law 
 
MICRONESIA Mixed Common Law/Customary 
MOLDOVA Civil Law 
 
MONACO Civil Law 
 
MONGOLIA Mixed Customary/Civil Law 
MONTSERRAT (UK) Common Law 
 
MONTENEGRO Civil Law 
 
MOROCCO Mixed Muslim/Civil Law 
MOZAMBIQUE Mixed Customary/Civil Law 
MYANMAR Mixed Common Law/Customary 
NAMIBIA Mixed Common Law/Civil Law 
NAURU Common Law 
 
NEPAL Mixed Common Law/Customary 
NETHERLANDS (NL) Civil Law 
 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES (NL) Civil Law 
 
NEW CALEDONIA (FR) Civil Law 
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NEW ZEALAND (NZ) Common Law 
 
NICARAGUA Civil Law 
 
NIGER Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
NIGERIA Mixed Common Law/Muslim/Customary 
NIUE ISLAND (NZ) Common Law 
 
NORFOLK ISLAND (AU) Common Law 
 
NORTHERN IRELAND (UK) Common Law 
 
NORWAY Civil Law 
 
OMAN Mixed Muslim/Customary/Civil Law 
PAKISTAN Mixed Muslim/Common Law 
PALAU Common Law 
 
PALESTINE Mixed Civil Law/Muslim 
PANAMA Civil Law 
 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA Mixed Customary/Common Law 
PARAGUAY Civil Law 
 
PERU Civil Law 
 
PHILIPPINES Mixed Common Law/Civil Law 
PITCAIRN (UK) Common Law 
 
POLAND Civil Law 
 
PORTO RICO (ASS. USA) Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
PORTUGAL (PG) Civil Law 
 
QATAR Mixed 
Muslim/Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary 
QUEBEC (CD) Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
REUNION ISLAND (FR) Civil Law 
 
ROMANIA Civil Law 
 
RUSSIA Civil Law 
 
RWANDA Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
SAINT-BARTHELEMY (FR) Civil Law 
 
SAINT HELENA (UK) Common Law 
 
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS Common Law 
 
SAINT LUCIA Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
SAINT MARTIN (FR) Civil Law 
 
SAINT PIERRE AND MIQUELON (FR) Civil Law 
 
SAINT VINCENT AND THE 
GRANADINES 
Common Law 
 
SAMOA Mixed Common Law/Customary 
SAMOA, AMERICAN (USA) Common Law 
 
SAN MARINO Civil Law 
 
SAO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
SAUDI ARABIA Muslim 
 
SCOTLAND (UK) Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
SENEGAL Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
SERBIA Civil Law 
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SEYCHELLES Mixed Common Law/Civil Law 
SIERRA LEONE Mixed Common Law/Customary 
SINGAPORE Mixed Common Law/Muslim 
SLOVAKIA Civil Law 
 
SLOVENIA Civil Law 
 
SOLOMON ISLANDS Mixed Common Law/Customary 
SOMALIA Mixed 
Muslim/Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary 
SOUTH AFRICA Mixed Civil Law/Common Law 
SOUTH GEORGIA AND SANDWICH 
ISLANDS (UK) 
Common Law 
 
SPAIN (SP) Civil Law 
 
SRI LANKA Mixed 
Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary 
SUDAN Mixed Muslim/Common Law 
SURINAME Civil Law 
 
SWAZILAND Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
SWEDEN Civil Law 
 
SWITZERLAND Civil Law 
 
SYRIA Mixed Civil Law/Muslim 
TAIWAN Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
TAJIKISTAN Civil Law 
 
TANZANIA Mixed Common Law/Customary 
THAILAND Civil Law 
 
TOGO Mixed Civil Law/Customary 
TOKELAU (NZ) Common Law 
 
TONGA Common Law 
 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Common Law 
 
TUNISIA Mixed Civil Law/Muslim 
TURKEY Civil Law 
 
TURKMENISTAN Civil Law 
 
TURKS AND CAICOS (UK) Common Law 
 
TUVALU Common Law 
 
UGANDA Mixed Common Law/Customary 
UKRAINE Civil Law 
 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Mixed Muslim/Customary 
UNITED KINGDOM (UK) (minus 
SCOTLAND, GUERNSEY AND 
JERSEY) 
Common Law 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(USA) (minus LOUISIANA) 
Common Law 
 
URUGUAY Civil Law 
 
UZBEKISTAN Civil Law 
 
VANUATU Mixed 
Civil Law/Customary/Common 
Law 
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VATICAN/HOLY SEE Civil Law 
 
VENEZUELA Civil Law 
 
VIETNAM Civil Law 
 
VIRGIN ISLANDS (USA) Common Law 
 
VIRGIN ISLANDS (UK) Common Law 
 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA (FR) Civil Law 
 
YEMEN Mixed 
Muslim/Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary 
ZAMBIA Mixed Common Law/Customary 
ZIMBABWE Mixed 
Civil Law/Common 
Law/Customary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
B Summary in German / Deutsche 
Zusammenfassung 
 
 Die Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage in welchem Ausmaß die 
spezifischen Eigenschaften der beiden weitverbreitetsten Rechtssysteme, des 
Common Law Systems und des Civil Law Systems, Korruption in der Justiz 
beeinflussen. Nach einem Überblick über wesentliche Grundlagen der Problematik 
der Korruption und über die beiden analysierten Rechtssysteme, werden in der 
Diplomarbeit die wichtigsten Gründe für Korruption in der Justiz beschrieben und 
analysiert welche Gründe sich einem Rechtssystem eher zuordnen lassen. Es wird 
geschlossen, dass der einzige, die Korruption betreffende, relevante Unterschied 
zwischen den beiden Rechtssystemen, der unterschiedliche Grad der 
Gewährleistung der Unabhängigkeit der Justiz ist. Die Rechtssysteme haben 
demnach nur einen Einfluss auf jene Gründe für Korruption in der Justiz, die auf 
mangelnde oder zu große Unabhängigkeit der Justiz zurückzuführen sind. Diese 
beiden Gründe sind einerseits politischer Einfluss auf die Justiz sowie mangelnde 
Kontrolle der Justiz. In einem nächsten Schritt wird die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz 
untersucht, dabei wird geschlossen, dass optimale Grade von Unabhängigkeit 
gefunden werden müssen um die Justiz immun gegen Korruption zu machen. 
Einerseits darf die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz nicht zu klein sein, da dies politische 
Einflussname zur Folge hat, andererseits führt eine zu große Unabhängigkeit zu 
mangelnden Möglichkeiten die Justiz zu überwachen. Abschließend werden drei 
Features eines Modells vorgestellt welches dazu beitragen soll optimale Grade von 
Unabhängigkeit der Justiz zu garantieren. 
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